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Tolerance as a European Norm or an Ottoman Practice?
An Analysis of Turkish Public Debates on the (Re)Opening of an 
Armenian Church in the Context of Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Neo-
Ottoman Revival
Bilgin Ayata
Abstract 
Turkey has undergone significant legal and institutional reforms regarding minority rights and cultural rights in the 
past decade as part of a reform process to meet political criteria for EU membership. However, it has not been 
studied so far if this increasing institutional compliance has also led to transformations at a normative level in the 
public discourse in Turkey. To explore this question, this paper presents the results of a qualitative media analysis 
that I conducted on the restoration and reopening of an Armenian church in 2007 – a milestone for the Republic 
as churches were destroyed or doomed to vanish for nearly a century since the Armenian Genocide in 1915. The 
restoration of the Sourp Khatch/Akhtamar Church became a showcase for Turkey’s self-promotion as a ‘tolerant 
nation’. However, the church was notably made accessible to the public as a museum that initially lacked the cross 
on its dome and was conceived to only host a religious service once a year. This opening of a church-museum 
is a symbolic instance in Turkey’s ongoing transformation process in which tolerance and plurality have become 
prominent keywords in politics and public debate. Yet, as the findings suggest, they do not so as a reflection of 
European norms, but rather stand for a rediscovery and reinterpretation of Turkey’s Ottoman past practices as a 
multi-religious empire. I show, however, that this reinterpretation occurs on the shaky grounds of a blindfolded 
view of the past, in particular the denial of the Armenian Genocide, and on the denial that minorities are still 
endangered in present day Turkey. I conclude that, without an acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide, 
Turkey’s nostalgic embracement of the Ottoman past and representation of norms such as tolerance as the ‘true’ 
Turkish/Islamic norms do not stand for a norm internalization or a norm adaption process, but instead, for a 
disconnection between norm and practice.
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1 Introduction: Research Question and the Case
1.1 The Transformative Power of Europe in Turkey
In the present study, I aim to investigate if and to what degree Europe’s transformative power can be ob-
served in Turkish public discourses on religious freedom, pluralism, and tolerance. Turkey has undergone 
significant legal and institutional reforms regarding minority rights and cultural rights in the past decade as 
part of a reform process to meet political criteria for EU membership. This is remarkable considering the 
outright and official denial of the existence of its Kurdish population for many decades, Turkey’s vehement 
denial of the Armenian Genocide, and its violent efforts to assimilate and repress cultural differences of its 
religious and ethnic minorities. These institutional reforms were accompanied by a vibrant public debate 
amongst intellectuals and opinion makers in which these reforms were often embedded in discussions 
on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership, either as an unfavorable aspect of EU conditionality that could 
not be circumvented, or as desirable, liberalizing norms that Turkey should adopt (Bayraktar 2010; Fisher/
Müftüler-Bac 2010; Karaca forthcoming). While policy changes regarding minority rights complied overall 
with EU conditionality, it has not been studied so far if this increasing institutional compliance has also 
led to transformations at a normative level in the public discourse in Turkey. Furthermore, it has not been 
investigated in what way Europe’s own difficulties with its multicultural reality are reflected in the public 
debates in Turkey when decisions on policies regarding religious and ethnic minorities are at stake. Political 
decisions such as the Swiss minaret ban, the burqa ban in France, the deportation of Roma in August 2010 
in France, the controversy on Turkish language schools in Germany, as well as the rise of populist right-wing 
parties promoting anti-immigrant or anti-Islamic attitudes point to an increasing difficulty within Europe to 
deal with its own diversity (Göle 2010). Do these developments reduce the credibility of European norms? 
Are restrictive policies towards Muslims in Europe used as arguments to prevent an intensification of the 
EU reform process, or do they not matter, because European norms and practices serve only as distant and 
abstract references in a primarily domestic debate? To put it more generally, how close ”has Europe hit 
home” (Börzel/Risse 2000) in Turkey?
To pursue these questions, I will conduct a media content analysis from 2005-2010 to examine how the 
opening of the Armenian church Sourp Khatch/Akhtamar in 2007 (Church of the Holy Cross), located in the 
province of Van, has been debated in public discourse. The restoration and musealization of this church 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism became a showcase for the Turkish government 
in promoting an image of Turkey as a tolerant nation embracing its cultural plurality. I will first examine 
how government officials showcased the church restoration both domestically and abroad and then, in a 
second step, explore how domestic opinion makers and intellectuals1 in Turkey discussed this government 
initiative in the print media. I will also examine to what degree the EU appears as a reference point in these 
public debates, be it normatively or institutionally, in order to assess the transformative power of Europe 
in Turkey after 2005, hence after accession negotiations began. Yet, before moving to the empirical section 
of the paper, I will first discuss how the notion of tolerance is connected to a new confidence in Turkey 
and how Turkey’s relationship to the EU is changing. In a second step, I will present the importance of the 
Armenian Church as a signifier of this new ‘tolerance’ discourse.
1 For an excellent overview on the role and importance of intellectuals in public debates in Turkey see Fisher Onar/
Evin 2010.
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1.2 The Transformations of Turkey on its Way to Europe
With the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, 
Turkey radically turned its back from its Ottoman past and underwent an ambitious modernization project 
that foresaw its future firmly anchored in the West. In this narrative of the newly established nation-state, 
the Ottoman Empire was portrayed as backwards and rejected as a source of national identity of modern 
Turkey, while the West stood for an irrevocable, national aspiration of belonging to the community of 
modern civilizations. The state ideology of Kemalism,2 which became an official doctrine after the death of 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), epitomizes this distinction from the Ottoman Empire and its orientation towards 
the West, in particular to Europe. Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949, a member 
of NATO in 1952, and applied for associate membership at the EEC in 1959. It signed the Universal Human 
Rights Declaration in 1949, the European Convention on Human Rights in 1954, the Refugee Convention 
in 1961, and, more interestingly for the purpose of this paper, the UN Genocide Convention in 1950. 
Domestically, a radical, authoritarian modernization project was implemented during the one-party rule 
until 1946 which continued, albeit with a series of setbacks and challenges, after the transition to a multi-
party system (Öktem 2011). Yet, the ultimate state power remained in the hands of the military that staged 
four coup d’états between 1960 and 1997. As Kemalist modernity was based on harsh ethnic nationalism 
and rigid secularism, unsurprisingly, the Kurds and the Islamists became the main obstacles to the Kemalist 
project (Taspinar 2008). In the early years of the Republic, both groups, particularly the Kurds, were sup-
pressed through brutal state violence. However, the reemergence of the Kurdish and the Islamic move-
ments after the military coup in 1980, along with neoliberal pressures and the global restructuring of the 
international order after the end of the Cold War, set off a second transformation process in Turkey. While 
the basis for this transformation was laid in the 1990s by the late Turkish Prime Minister and President 
Turgut Özal, it is just now fully evolving (Colak 2006). What exactly this transformation process is about and 
where Turkey is heading to have been a topic of much speculation and controversy in the past few years. 
Given that the entire Middle East is subject to a significant and ongoing restructuring process since 2001, 
the developments in Turkey cannot be viewed in isolation from this messy regional transformation. At the 
same time, Turkey’s EU candidacy has spurred a drastic reform process since 1999. The range of interpreta-
tions of Turkey’s transformation oscillates between the poles of Europeanization and Neo-Ottomanism3 
that signify antagonistic developments in this picture: The image of a Turkey that is reforming to reach full 
EU membership is at odds with the image of a Turkey that is orienting itself stronger towards the Middle 
East and Islam. As these seemingly contradictory processes are clearly underway at the same time, it will 
be useful to depart from such antagonisms and instead more insightful to examine if and how these two 
processes converge, facilitate, obstruct, or even operate together in the transformation project that is, in 
essence, a reinvention of Turkish national identity.
2 The state ideology of Kemalism consists of six pillars: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, 
and revolutionism. These principles were adopted into the Turkish constitution in 1937.
3 Yavuz defines Neo-Ottomanism as the call for (1) the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political 
and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past; (2) the elimination of economic borders among the 
Balkan, Caucausian, and Middle Eastern countries; and (3) respect for the political borders of adjacent countries 
(Yavuz 1998: 40).
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1.3 Reinventing Turkish National Identity: Turkey as a ‘Tolerant Nation’?
1.3.1 From Rapture to Continuity with the Past
The starting point of this paper is my argument that, since the early 1990s, a domestic struggle by various 
political actors about Turkey’s national identity has taken place that inevitably forces Turkey to revisit its 
relationship with its past while it recasts its future. This entails a revision of the irrevocable goal of becom-
ing part of Europe at all costs, as it has been presented in the Kemalist modernization project. The rupture 
with the Ottoman past that has been critical for the founding myth of the Turkish nation-state is being re-
placed by a new national narrative that openly takes Islam as the basis of Turkish identity and culture, thus 
establishing a continuity with the Ottoman Empire. I argue that this becomes most apparent in the recent 
promotion of Turkey as a ‘tolerant nation’ which, ironically, rests upon the same denial that the Kemalist 
Republic insisted on: the refusal to confront the Armenian Genocide of 1915, that led to the almost total 
erasure and annihilation of the multi-religious plurality that had previously existed in the Eastern parts 
of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1987, after the EU Parliament recommended Turkey to acknowledge the 
Armenian Genocide and suggested to make it a formal criterion for Turkey’s EU candidacy, the issue of the 
open confrontation with the past has been lingering over Turkey’s EU accession (Bayraktar 2010). Officially, 
it never became part of the formal accession criteria, yet the fact that several member states contain larger 
numbers of citizens of Armenian descent, most prominently France4 and the Eastern European countries, 
and that eleven EU member states have passed resolutions in national parliaments acknowledging the 
Armenian Genocide, poses Turkey’s approach towards its past as a challenge for its future accession. The 
issue of the Armenian Genocide also plays an important role in the EU’s expectation that Turkey should 
improve relations with the Republic of Armenia (Philipps 2012). In the wake of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1994. However, under the reform pressure that the 
prospect of opening accession negotiations spurred, Turkey announced several steps to improve relations 
with Armenia since 2002. The announcement by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in 2005 that Turkey’s 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism will restore the Armenian Church Akhtamar has been presented as one of 
them, as I will show in more detail in section 3.
1.3.2 Turkey as the Heir of the Empire of Tolerance and Bridge of Civilizations
In November 2010, the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator Egemen Bagis received a reli-
gious freedom award by the American and European Orthodox Churches for “his contributions to initiatives 
in Turkey regarding religious minorities and his great efforts to build a bridge between different cultures 
and civilizations” (Hürriyet 2010). During the award ceremony at the European Parliament in Brussels that 
took place alongside a conference entitled “Religious Freedom: Turkey’s Bridge to the European Union”, 
Bagis first summarized the reforms that the Turkish government had undertaken in the past few years with 
regard to religious minorities in Turkey and then remarked:
4 France contains the largest number of the Armenian diaspora after the US, with an estimated 500 000 French 
citizens of Armenian descent.
8 | KFG Working Paper No. 41 | July 2012 
“for quite a long time, different religions, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, had lived in Anatolia in an 
atmosphere of complaisance. The other name of Ottoman Empire was ‘The Empire of Tolerance’. It is 
not surprising that the Ottoman Empire had provided a freer and more tolerable atmosphere than its 
European equivalent.” (Hürriyet 2010, my translation) 
Bagis not only presents a positive reference to the Ottoman Empire here, he even portrays it as superior to 
Europe with regard to tolerance. The notion of Ottoman tolerance is juxtaposed to present day Europe and 
its own difficulties with religious plurality. He continued his speech by pointing out that the night before, 
after having spent a day in Athens, he had to fly earlier than planned to Brussels as there was no mosque 
in Athens where he could perform his Bayram prayer. The Greek government does not permit mosques to 
be built – a thorny issue in the eyes of the Turkish government. The message was clear: While Turkey was 
being closely observed and monitored for its treatment of minorities, the practices of some EU member 
states are exempted from such scrutiny. Pointing out that, by 2025, about ten percent of Europe’s popula-
tion will be Muslim, Bagis also voiced his concern about the steady increase of islamophobia in Europe and 
provided counterexamples of tolerance from Turkey such as the recent openings of a number of Armenian 
churches. In his speech, EU Chief negotiator of Turkey, Bagis, skillfully managed to simultaneously show-
case Turkey’s progress with regard to religious minorities and to criticize Europe for its difficulties with its 
own Muslim minorities and the rise of islamophobia. Bagis’ speech illustrates vividly some of the current 
debates in Turkey and Europe that I want to explore further.
On the one hand, his speech in Brussels reflects the ‘new confidence’ of Turkey, or rather, that of the AKP 
government, that proudly draws on the country’s Ottoman past and rejects the view that values such as 
tolerance, pluralism, and multiculturalism are intrinsically European ideas and practices. In contrast to 
the traditional Kemalist elites in Turkey that readily accepted Europe for the past 90 years as its ultimate 
benchmark for civilization and modernity, the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - Justice and Development 
Party) government – with its populist leader PM Erdogan, its intellectual Foreign Minister Davutoglu, the 
soft-spoken Head of State Gül, and the youthful Chief Negotiator Bagis – gave rise to a new era in Turkish 
politics that no longer accepts to sit quietly “in the waiting room of Europe” (Ahiska 2011). This new era 
entails a revised foreign policy strategy that, instead of simply following American and European interests 
as Turkey has been doing since the founding of the Republic in 1923, sets its own priorities and agenda 
openly seeking for regional and global leadership in a multipolar world. Some observers describe this 
change in foreign policy as “Neo-Ottomanism” (Taspinar 2008), others see this as a new orientation of 
a “Postwestern Turkey in a Postwestern Europe” (Rumford 2006). Irrespective of the label chosen for this 
change in foreign policy, it is clear that the EU is no longer the only option for Turkey, an argument that all 
four of the above mentioned politicians do not get tired to remind international observers. As a matter of 
fact, it is currently only the Chief Negotiator Bagis himself who actively promotes Turkey’s EU accession 
in Turkey and in European countries, while Erdogan and Davutoglu are too busy with global affairs, be it in 
Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, or most recently, Egypt and Tunesia. With the Arab uprisings and regime changes 
in 2011, Turkey’s potential role in the region both as a “bridge between civilizations” as well as a “successful 
democracy” (as set forth by international commentators) has intensified the interest in Turkey’s transfor-
mation process that accelerated both with the rise of the AKP as well as Turkey’s EU accession.
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1.3.3 Quo Vadis Turkey?
With only one out of 35 chapters of the accession negotiation process successfully closed (with only thir-
teen opened so far) and a strand in scholarship arguing that the domestic EU reform process has been stag-
nating since 2005 (Saatcioglu 2010; Önis 2010), Turkey is nevertheless going through one of the most criti-
cal transformation processes of the last decades. This transformation appears not only to be breaking with 
the military legacy of the Republic – which earlier resulted in three bloody military coups and a protracted 
internal war for two decades in the Kurdish region – but also with the orthodoxy of Kemalism, the official 
state ideology (Ulusoy 2009). Inevitably, this is a fierce power struggle between old and new stakeholders 
that range from the bureaucratic state elite to the judiciary, paramilitary forces, academia, the military, the 
media, the government itself, as well civil society organizations. For Ulusoy, this transformation is only the 
second wave of a Europeanization process that has begun with the modernizing reforms (Tanzimat era) in 
the Ottoman Empire (Ulusoy 2009). Hence, Ulusoy regards the ongoing transformation process in Turkey 
as another step of a larger European modernization project, even though the main actors of this process 
are previously excluded Islamic political actors and not the earlier Western-oriented Kemalists. In contrast 
to this view, Tugal’s (2009) thorough analysis of the rise of the AKP in Turkey argues that the current trans-
formation is a passive revolution in the Gramscian sense, leading to the successful absorption of Islam 
into capitalism. He describes this process as an alternative modernization that differs from the European 
trajectory. Göle (2011) goes a step further and asserts that Turkey has entered a “post-European” era, in 
which Europe no longer stands as the ultimate goal for Turkey’s modernization, but instead is reconfiguring 
its identity and place in its neighborhood and the world.
With the recent elections in June 2011, the AKP has ever more consolidated its power and, certainly, vari-
ous political outcomes of this transformation process are possible (Ayata 2012). A more consolidated de-
mocracy is only one of several options, as could be an end to Turkey’s never-ending EU-candidacy status. 
Both the current developments in the Middle East as well as the next elections in France, Germany, and 
the UK will have a considerable impact which further direction this transformation process will take. Yet, 
irrespective of its outcome, the challenge that Turkey presents to the EU (and Europe to Turkey) is going 
to continue stirring heated debates about what Europe is and wants to be and where Turkey is positioning 
itself – if it does not want to be a “bridge” forever. What can be safely asserted is that even if Turkey or 
the EU decided to drop the quest for membership and agree on alternative configurations,5 Turkey’s trans-
formation process will continue, as the Copenhagen Criteria have already been redefined into a domestic 
driven goal, the “Ankara Criteria” by PM Erdogan in 2005 (Hürriyet 2005c).
5 In his book “A Turkey that can say No to Europe,” one of Turkey’s leading business men, Cem Kozlu, is advocating 
that Turkey should pursue alternative paths to full EU membership, as that prospect is economically less attractive 
for Turkey than it used to be a decade ago (Kozlu 2011). 
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2. The Case of the Armenian Church Sourp Khatch/Akthamar 
The renovation and opening of the Sourp Khatch/Akhtamar indeed stands for a historic moment in Turkey. 
While there were 2,538 churches, 451 monasteries, and 2,000 Christian schools in Ottoman Turkey by 1913, 
there are only 59 active churches and 16 schools left today (Özinian 2010). After 1915, not only almost the 
entire non-Muslim community was annihilated or deported, but also their buildings destroyed or doomed 
to vanish (Ungör/Polatel 2011). The church Sourp Khatch is one of the oldest Armenian sacred sites which 
was last used as a weaponry by German troops during WWI. In 2005, the Turkish government announced 
its renovation. The renovated church was inaugurated on March 29, 2007, yet, with several shortcomings: 
It was not opened as a church but instead as a “secular museum” and it lacked a cross on the dome. The 
ministry did not allow for religious service and, moreover, it did not preserve the original Armenian name 
of the Church “Sourp Khatch” but instead turkified it by naming it Akdamar, which means white vein.6 After 
much criticism, the government finally allowed for a mass to be held once a year, and installed a cross on 
the dome in 2010.
I have selected the case of Sourp Khatch because the renovation and reopening of the church not only 
carries a highly symbolic meaning with Turkey’s engagement with religious difference, but also because it 
reflects very material concerns of Turkey to redefine itself as a tolerant Muslim country that is embracing 
its cultural diversity. Secondly, I chose the case of Sourp Khatch as it falls within a period that is usually be-
ing described as a time of stagnation of the EU reforms (Saatcioglu 2010; Önis 2010). Given that Turkey’s re-
luctance to confront its violent past and to reconcile with the Armenian Community has become part of an 
informal EU conditionality, in which – according to Seyhan Bayraktar – Turkey’s generic „Europafähigkeit“/
Turkey’s EU-capability is mostly played out (Bayraktar 2010), the case of Akhtamar is particularly useful to 
explore the prevalence of EU’s normative power in this process.
For this study, I analyzed opinion pieces in four Turkish dailies for the years 2005-2010 in order to 
evaluate:
• if and to what degree external factors such as Turkey’s EU accession or Turkey’s foreign policy  
 concerns figure in this domestic debate
• in what ways European norms or practices – either as a guiding norm or as a negative example  
 such as the restriction of religious freedoms regarding Muslims in Europe – are being referred to  
 in the discussions on the Akhtamar Church
6 I use Sourp Khatch (Church of the Holy Cross) and Akhtamar alternately in this text. The Armenian expression 
„Aghatamar“ refers to an old Armenian legend of the island on Lake Van where the church is located. Accordingly, 
an Armenian princess named Tamar was in love with a Kurdish boy across the lake. This boy would swim from the 
mainland each night to the island, following the light Tamar was holding up at night. One night, her father, who dis-
approved the boy’s visit, smashed her light while he was swimming towards her. The boy drowned, exclaiming “Agh 
Tamar!” in sorrow, and for centuries, the island and the church on it were referred to as Aghatamar in the region. 
The original name of the church was “Sourp Khatch” (Church of the Holy Cross). Since presently, there are various 
Armenian spellings and names in circulation, I am following, for the sake of readability, the spelling „Akhtamar“ as 
it is used by some Armenian writers (see Sassounian 2010 or Raffi Hermonn in Devrim 2007)
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• if there is a qualitative change of the discourse over time, particularly in the context of declining  
 public interest in Turkey’s EU accession both in Turkey and Europe.
I surveyed over 400 news items, opinion articles, and columns in the Turkish dailies Zaman, Hürriyet, 
Hürriyet Daily News, and Radikal that contained the word Akdamar.7 Of these, I only focus on opinion 
pieces and columns (64 in total) for an in-depth content analysis. The selection of columnist and opinion 
makers is useful as they are very widely read in Turkey and play a critical role in the Turkish public sphere 
(Fisher Onar/Müftüler Bac 2010). My choice of newspapers follows political cleavages as well as their popu-
larity. The pro-government daily Zaman is a conservative, Islamic-oriented newspaper that has the highest 
circulation in Turkey at present (approximately 900,000). It is a high quality newspaper that includes a 
diverse array of columnists, including liberal intellectuals and minority members such as the Armenian 
journalist Etyen Mahcupyan or the Alevi-Kurdish writer Bejan Matur. Zaman represents the new elite in 
Turkey, while the daily Hürriyet is a conservative and populist paper that represents the Kemalist establish-
ment, hence the old military and state elites. For many years, it had the highest circulation, yet currently 
ranks number three (approximately 400,000). It has still the country’s most prominent columnists such 
as Ertugrul Özkök, Mehmet Ali Birand, and Cengiz Candar and is a very influential paper representing the 
mainstream of Turkey. In addition, I surveyed the English language edition of Hürriyet (formerly “Turkish 
Daily News”), which targets foreign diplomats and international business circles and is very different from 
the Turkish language edition of the paper, regarding quality and audience. While the circulation is very 
small (approximately 5,000), it is a forum where Turkey represents itself to the international community, 
which is why I included it in the survey. Selected articles by Turkish columnists belonging to the largest 
media group Dogan appear in the English edition, which provides a larger choice of opinion articles for 
my survey. Finally, I selected the progressive daily Radikal despite its small circulation as it is probably the 
most ‘Europhile’ newspaper and provides a vibrant forum for the liberal academic elite in Turkey. Together 
with its Sunday edition, it publishes the magazine Radikal 2 in which civil society representatives, intel-
lectuals, and scholars write larger opinion pieces on critical issues. I have left out staunch opponents of the 
EU process such as the ultranationalist and ultrareligious newspapers as I am interested in likely cases of 
norm diffusion. For the data analysis I follow a qualitative content analytical approach where I will not only 
concentrate on text contents but also link the contents to contexts.
Previous studies that undertook media content analysis or qualitative elite surveys have found a strong 
prevalence of EU norms and values in Turkish domestic debates on tolerance and pluralism until the mid-
2000s (Bayraktar 2010; Fisher Onar/Bac-Müftüler 2010). The findings of Bayraktar’s extensive study on the 
discursive opening of one of the most salient taboos in Turkey– the Armenian Genocide – with an analy-
sis of the Turkish media from 1973-2005 shows that external pressure exercised either by the Armenian 
Diaspora, the US, or the EU/EU member states precedes most instances of discursive openings with regard 
to Armenians in Turkey. This also reflects on normative reference points in debates: Especially in the run 
up to Turkey’s EU candidacy between 1999 and 2005, EU norms and criteria served frequently as an argu-
mentative frame when Turkish intellectuals were discussing a particular event or policy reform related to 
Armenians. For instance, when a group of historians and intellectuals attempted to organize an alternative 
conference at the Bosphorus University in 2005 dealing with the fate of Ottoman Armenians and thereby 
7 My search included all variations of the spelling of Akdamar.
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diverging from the official denialist history, a massive uproar followed when the conference announce-
ment was made public. Minister of Justice Cemil Cicek – an otherwise rather reform zealous member of 
the AKP government – accused the organizers for being traitors of Turkey and described the conference 
as a stab into Turkey’s back, as it would now be even more difficult to ward off Armenian genocide claims 
(Bayraktar 2010: 249).8 In response, several liberal commentators noted in their columns that the ‘real’ 
traitors are those who endanger Turkey’s EU candidacy with such narrow-minded interventions ( Bayraktar 
2010: 249).
Given that this incident took place shortly before accession negotiations were opened with Turkey, I expect 
for my case study of the Akhtamar Church fewer references to EU norms and criteria as a result of the 
strengthening of civil society, the intensification of the transformation process, further discursive opening, 
and the declining public support for Turkey’s EU candidacy. However, especially in opinion pieces by liberal 
critics who find the opening of the church as a secular museum, its missing cross and turkified name to be 
problematic and insufficient, I do expect EU norms still to be part of the argumentative framework, espe-
cially when there are demands for more acknowledgement of plurality and a tolerant society. 
Moreover, I am interested to what degree questions of multiculturalism and minority rights in Europe and 
Turkey are intertwined and whether Turkey’s EU candidacy makes these debates more salient. While it 
has been researched how Turkey’s EU candidacy is being discussed in the European public (e.g., Wimmel 
2006; Giannakopoulos/Maras 2005; Risse 2010), an analysis of the discursive interactions between Turkish 
and European debates has not been undertaken. This research will contribute to the literature, not only 
by shifting the focus away from solely Europe’s perceptions of Turkey’s candidacy, but by equally consider-
ing the Turkish debates. Highlighting discursive linkages of European and Turkish public debates, it also 
seeks to offer innovative ways for expanding the boundaries of a European public sphere as it is conceived 
today.
3. Empirical Findings: Government Policies and Public Debates on the Akhtamar          
     Church
3.1 The Government Perspective on the Sourp Khatch Church in the Turkish Media  
      (2005- 2010)
On May 18, 2005, PM Erdogan announced in a group party meeting of the AKP that he commissioned 
the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to renovate the Holy Cross Church in Van. The restoration would pro-
ceed with state funds and in cooperation with the Armenian community in Turkey (Zaman 2005). Earlier 
in 2004, the European Parliament had issued a resolution on the EU Commission’s report on Turkey’s 
8 Under the immense pressure of the media and politicians, the university cancelled the conference. Yet, a few 
months later, PM Erdogan pushed for the realization of the conference with the request that it should take place 
before the important EU Council meeting in October 2005, which was going to decide when accession negota-
tions would be opened with Turkey. Only three days before this EU Council meeting, the conference took place at 
another university in Istanbul, eventually (Bayraktar 2010: 250).
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progress towards accession that included the recommendation for Turkey to register Akhtamar along with 
a number of other sites in the World Heritage List of the UNESCO.9 Yet, what directly preceded Erdogan’s 
speech on May 18 was the Third Summit of the Council of Europe that took place on May 16-17, 2005 in 
Warsaw. The Republic of Armenia, which had become a member of the Council of Europe in 2001, partici-
pated for the first time in this summit and Armenia’s President Kocharyan demanded in his address to the 
Council that Turkey should recognize the Armenian Genocide (Philipps 2012). Upon this public shaming of 
Turkey by Kocharyan, PM Erdogan cancelled their planned meeting and was faced with questions about 
the Armenian Genocide from the international press following Kocharyan’s remarks. Upon his return to 
Turkey, Erdogan reported to his party members about the summit; his speech was cited in the surveyed 
newspapers for two consecutive days. Erdogan presented the restoration of the church as part of Turkey’s 
“retaliation against Genocide”, namely against the 15 countries around the globe that have acknowledged 
the Armenian Genocide in parliamentary resolutions. In an attempt to counter this international pressure, 
Erdogan announced at this group party meeting that Turkey will begin to pass genocide resolutions with 
regard to those 15 countries:
“Some of these countries have carried out genocides themselves. We will pass resolutions in our 
Parliament with regard to this. We will do this step. Why? Because Turkey has not abased itself into 
committing genocide in its history. It is impossible that we would accept this.” (Erdogan cited in Zaman 
2005, my translation)
He then mentions the improvements in the relations with Armenia since the AKP came into government 
by bringing up that his government introduced direct flights between Yerewan and Istanbul (despite the 
border being closed between Turkey and Armenia) and announcing the start of the restoration of the 
Akhtamar church (Erdogan cited in Zaman 2005). The argumentation, that the opening of the church is 
a step towards the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations on the one hand, and a message to the 
world to counter Genocide claims on the other, composes the core of the official view until 2007. While 
some news items make references to the EU recommendation of 2004, they also report statements by 
PM Erdogan that this renovation will be the appropriate response to countries such as France and other 
countries which recognized the Armenian Genocide via parliamentary resolutions (Hürriyet Daily News 
2005). The church restoration is presented in the official speeches not as an occasion for engagement with 
the country’s past, but rather as a useful political instrument against critics of Turkey (Hürriyet 2005a). A 
third aspect contained in the news items from 2005-2007 regarding Akhtamar are the expected economic 
benefits of renovating churches and other sites of non-Muslim belief as this would increase revenues from 
faith tourism (Hürriyet 2005b).
9 Recommendation 12 invites Turkey to “drastically improve its perception of ethnic and religious minorities, for in-
stance by highlighting their contributions to the cultural heritage of the country; in particular, requests the Turkish 
authorities to consider some of these specific contributions such as Hasankeyf, Ani, Zeugma or Aghtamar as suit-
able for registration in the World Heritage List of UNESCO.“ (EU Parliament, 2004)
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3.1.1 Suppressing Genocide Claims through Church Renovations
The intention to suppress Armenian genocide claims through the renovation of Akhtamar became most 
visible when the Minister of Culture Koc announced in 2006 that the church would be opened as a museum 
on April 24, 2007 (Koc cited in Hürriyet 2006). April 24 marks the Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day 
as on this day in 1915, over 250 Armenian intellectuals were detained and deported, signaling the start 
of the violence that was to follow (Dadrian 1995). Apart from the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, this at-
tempt to reinterpret the meaning of April 24th by the Minister of Culture through the inauguration of the 
church was ignored by the Turkish press. Yet, after heavy criticism by Armenian organizations from outside 
Turkey, the date for the inauguration was changed to April 11, which – as again Hrant Dink alerted to – cor-
responds to April 24 in the old Armenian calendar (Radikal 2007). This rather obvious manipulative intent 
of the church opening through the ministry came to a halt after a shocking event in 2007. On January 19, 
2007, Hrant Dink was assassinated on a busy street in Istanbul in front of his office. This murder against 
the most vocal and visible member of the remaining Armenian community in Turkey numbering less than 
100,000 showed that it is not just churches and artefacts that need protection, but that the very Christian 
minority itself is still living under threat. Some banners during commemorations outside of Turkey read 
“1,500.000 +1”, suggesting that Hrant Dink is the latest victim of the Genocide, hence linking the past to the 
present. The murder of Hrant Dink was reported widely, also in the international media, putting the AKP 
government under pressure regarding its treatment of religious minorities.10
3.1.2 When the Past Comes Closer: The Aftermath of the Hrant Dink’s Murder
An unexpected uproar came by the progressive segments of Turkish civil society which underwent a deep 
shock about the murder of Dink who was an active member of it. His funeral, which was attended by over 
100,000 people in Istanbul, became a turning point for the progressive part of Turkish civil society which 
was now displaying a heightened awareness for the vulnerability of religious minorities in Turkey. The 
murder also had an unintended effect on the Akhtamar debate: The last article by Dink that appeared 
on the day he was shot dead concerned the Akhtamar church, in which he described the delay of the 
inauguration of the church as a “comedy” and sharply criticized the halfhearted efforts of the government 
(Candar 2007). Dink’s article was reprinted and widely read after his murder, which may be the reason 
why the opening date was changed again to a neutral date and the church eventually inaugurated on 
March 29, 2007. After Dink’s murder, statements by Erdogan and other officials mention the church less in 
the context of fighting off genocide claims, and instead underscore the notion of Turkish tolerance when 
talking about Akhtamar. In fact, in the time period from 2007-2010, Akhtamar was frequently mentioned 
by government officials as a sign of goodwill and tolerance that Turkey shows towards Armenians (Zaman 
2009).
10 As a party emerging out of the Islamic movement, the AKP had to prove at home and abroad that Western democ-
racy and Islam are compatible and that the AKP will not undermine or challenge the secular order in Turkey and/or 
endanger non-Muslim or non-religious communities.
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For instance, when a domestic petition campaign by some Turkish intellectuals in 2008 apologized to 
Armenians for the denial of the “great catastrophe” that befell Armenians in 1915, PM Erdogan furiously 
responded that Turkey had nothing to apologize for and mentioned in this context that the Turkish Republic 
opened the doors of an Armenian-Orthodox church to the entire world with the restoration of Akhtamar: 
“We did this without any expectation in return. This is a sign of something” (PM Erdogan cited in Hürriyet 
2008). The use of the church as a sign of tolerance intensifies 2010, after the government – following do-
mestic and international demands – allowed for a mass to be held once a year and a cross to be installed on 
the top of the dome. While Erdogan mainly uses the example of Akhtamar as an expression of tolerance of 
“the Turk” that the world should take notice of, the Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Bagis is the only govern-
ment member who makes a connection to meeting EU standards when talking about Akhtamar (Zaman 
2010).
3.1.3 Summary of Official View: Four Frames
In sum, the official view regarding Akhtamar consists of four argumentative frames that all emphasize its 
strategic gain: the opening of the church as a
(1) response towards genocide claims,
(2) step towards improving relations with the Republic of Armenia,
(3) step to increase revenues from faith tourism, 
(4) message to the world of how tolerant Turkey is towards its minorities.
In the next step, I will trace in an in-depth analysis how the public discussed the restoration and opening of 
the Holy Cross Church and assess if the public discourse follows or departs from the argumentative frames 
of the official discourse.
3.2 Content Analysis of Selected Opinion Pieces
Shortly before and after the inauguration of the Akhtamar church, a debate emerged in the Turkish media. 
While the opening of the church-museum is applauded as a positive step unanimously in the surveyed 
newspapers, there is also a significant diversity in voices and arguments. For instance, while the conserva-
tive-nationalist journalist Taha Akyol congratulates Erdogan and his government for his “courageous initia-
tive” and sharply criticizes a European journalist asking questions about the Armenian Genocide during a 
press conference (T. Akyol 2007), his son Mustafa Akyol, a Muslim-liberal journalist and currently deputy 
editor in chief of the Hürriyet Daily News, also welcomes the opening, but sharply criticizes the government 
for the turkification of the name and the prohibition of religious service two days later (M. Akyol 2007). 
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Cengiz Candar, a prominent progressive-liberal journalist even calls the opening of a church as a museum 
a “cultural genocide”:
“You restore a historical church and find absurd reasons for not putting a cross and a bell onto it? Who 
will believe that you are secular, or that you ‘respect all faiths,’ or that you represent ‘the alliance of 
civilizations against the clash of civilizations.’ What you do is simply ‘cultural genocide’.” (Candar 2007)
Candar’s sharp critique of the government policy stands in this scope rather alone in 2007, as he also makes 
a critical reference to Dink’s murder and its halfhearted investigation. Despite the broad condemnation of 
Dink’s murder in January across all democratic political spectra in the Turkish media, the other surveyed 
columns on the Akhtamar inauguration do not make a connection to Dink’s murder and merely assert pride 
and hope for a new beginning in Turkey, where tolerance and plurality are embraced. Once the uncomfort-
able fact that the lives of religious minorities are still in danger in Turkey11 is ignored, it becomes rather easy 
to enjoy artifacts as cultural richness and connect it with national pride. For instance, a vocal critic of the 
AKP government, the journalist Mehmet Yilmaz from Hürriyet, remarks on the occasion of the Akhtamar 
opening that for many years, just as mosques in the Balkans and bridges from the Ottoman Empire have 
been destroyed and not been taken care of, Turkey too failed to preserve its churches:
“Today, we should take pride in showing the courage to turn away from this wrong path. Each artifact 
on this street, no matter who built it or when it was built, is part of a cultural work that belongs to 
us. It is our task to preserve them and leave them intact for the next generations.” (Yilmaz 2007, my 
translation)
It is rather interesting how smooth this incorporation of cultural richness as part of national identity can 
sometimes occur even for nationalist journalists. A remark of a sports journalist a few months after the 
Akhtamar opening exemplifies this rather well. After visiting a soccer camp in the city of Van, he states:
“I am saying this from the bottom of my heart. “How happy is he who can call himself a Turk”. I was so 
pleased to go to Van for a day, I suggest everybody to visit Van. The beauty of the Lake Van, the amazing 
Akdamar Church, the pearl of the East attracts each year thousands of tourists. Why are we not going 
ourselves? In my view, those who have not seen this region full of historical beauty in Turkey do actually 
not know Turkey.” (Bayatli 2007, my translation)
In 2008 and 2009, there is very little debate on Akhtamar, yet the critique of the missing cross appears in 
general pieces on Turkey’s transformation. For instance, Selcuk Gültasli, a journalist of Zaman, notes in his 
article about the “Anxious Republic” that the fear of the other is central to Turkey’s identity:
11 In addition to Dink, the catholic priest Andrea Santoro was murdered in February 2006 by ultranationalist in 
Trabzon. Furthermore, in April 2007, three Christian missionaries were brutally murdered in Malatya, with their 
throats being cut. The perpetrators of all murders are young men who are suspected to have only executed orders 
by a network connected to the “deep state”. In 2010, another catholic priest was murdered in Antakya, apparantly 
without political motives by his assistant. Given the small community of Christians in Turkey, who number less then 
100, 000, these murders show the vulnerability of religious minorities in Turkey.
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“If we open Heybeliada, which was built by the Ottomans, we are afraid that Istanbul is going to become 
the Vatican. We restore the Akdamar church but oppose to put a cross on top of it. Would we confess 
that those lands belonged to Armenians if we would do otherwise?” (Gültasli 2008, my translation)
A similar line of self-critical discussion about the “Anxious Republic” of fear was led by Hürriyet’s columnist 
Fatih Cekirge in an article on the missing cross and religious service in Akhtamar, which he had visited to-
gether with the Minister for EU affairs Egemen Bagis. According to a popular legend in Turkey, a monster is 
living in Lake Van where the Akhtamar island is located. Alluding to this legend, Cekirge notes:
“Akdamar church is not taken care off. (…) They prohibited the cross and religious service. In Europe, 
religious service is allowed in mosques. Why is there such a ban here? Look at this. Kurdish? What’s 
that…Armenian Church…close to the Armenian border…Prohibit the Kurdish language. The Greek are 
evil anyway…put a ban on this, don’t allow that…For years, haven’t we been living in a ‘horror’ movie? 
(…) In the middle of Lake Van, I have seen how a nation diminishes its own history and richness in a 
horrible way. And there, I have found the infamous monster of Lake Van: Yes, the monster of Lake Van 
is this mentality of prohibition. Actually, this ghostly monster is actually us, ourselves. Because for years, 
we have been eating up our freedoms, riches, beliefs, history, ourselves, in a monstrous way.” (Cekirge 
2009, my translation)
After domestic and international critique concerning the missing cross and the ban of religious service at 
the Akhtamar Church, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator Bagis announced in 2009 that a cross would be installed, 
and that the museum will be opened for religious services once a year. The long-awaited mass was held on 
September 19, 2010 accompanied by a major media spectacle that underlined the high symbolic meaning 
of the restoration of this church. A cross was brought to the church, but was not put on the dome in time for 
the service (supposedly for technical reasons), which led to the boycott by many groups of the Armenian 
Diaspora to attend the mass (Sassounian 2010). The debates in the Turkish media on the church intensified 
in 2010, as the protests by ultranationalist circles are getting louder as well. A month before the mass was 
held at Akhtamar, the government also allowed for a mass to take place at one of the oldest monasteries 
in the world, the Sümela Monastery in Trabzon, which was attended by orthodox Greeks from all over the 
world. The ultranationalist parties in Turkey, MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – Nationalist Action Party) and 
BBP (Büyük Birlik Partisi – Great Union Party), tried to mobilize their members against this “invasion” of the 
Armenian and Greek Diaspora in Turkey. The ultranationalist media launched a campaign against the mass, 
which was criticized by Muslim-liberal writers such as by Akyol:
“When the ancient Armenian church in Akdamar, Van, was reopened last Sunday to worship after be-
ing empty for 95 years – a move which I applauded, but found only insufficient – do you know which 
newspaper voiced a strong protest? Not the Islamic press, not even the boldly Islamist Vakit. It was 
Yenicag – a ferociously nationalist paper whose motto presents a huge photo of Atatürk. Under a dis-
gusting headline, ‘Armenian Mass on the Rape Island’, the paper alleged that Akdamar was a place 
where Armenian militias raped Muslim women during World War I. Of course, I am not saying that 
all secular-minded people in Turkey are die-hard fascists like this, or even necessarily illiberal. That 
would be most untrue and unfair. What is fair to say, though, is that if we are going to speak about 
‘secularists versus conservatives’ in Turkey, the former group really does not represent a more liberal 
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or democratic mindset. Quite the contrary: While the conservatives have shown progress in the past 
decade, evidenced by their support for EU reforms, most secularists have grown growingly paranoid 
and xenophobic.” (M. Akyol 2010)
This criticism of secularists by portraying conservatives as more progressive since they supported EU re-
forms was a rare example of the EU being mentioned as a reference point in the columns in 2010. Overall, 
the debate became more domestic and reflected the growing cleavage between nationalists, conserva-
tives, and liberals that intensified with the constitutional referendum in September 2010.
In summary, three main trends can be detected from the present stage of the content analysis of the 
articles from 2005-2010: 1) The restoration and opening of the Akhtamar church is generally welcomed 
as a step into the right direction, but the government is being criticized by liberal opinion makers both 
for the turkification of the name as well as for not allowing a cross on the dome for three years. 2) When 
formulating this critique, the EU or Turkey’s accession process is absent as a reference, as the focus is either 
on domestic gains or on the improvement of neighborly relations with the Republic of Armenia. 3) Themes 
such as tolerance and pluralism in the context of religious minorities are framed as being part of Turkey’s 
heritage and own culture, and not as European norms. Rather than acquiring new norms, the question ar-
rises how Turkey has come to lose the appreciation of cultural richness in the light of its Ottoman past. The 
increase of islamophobia in the EU is observed with discomfort, yet it is evaluated as a loss for Europe and 
as an inner-European problem, with only few authors making a direct connection to Turkey and Turkey’s 
EU accession at all.
The finding of a weak reference to Europe or Turkey’s accession process is congruent with Karaca’s qualita-
tive study on Istanbul’s Cultural Capital of Europe tenure in 2010 (Karaca, forthcoming). In this study, a 
similar absence of a normative reference to Europe was manifest in interviews with numerous key domes-
tic actors in the run-up to 2010, when Istanbul was – along with Pecs, Hungary and Ruhr, Germany – one of 
the designated cultural capitals of Europe. If at all, references to the EU accession process were limited to 
exerting pressure on government agency as a strategy relating solely to domestic issues rather than in the 
form of engagements with reified notions of “European values.”
3.3. Norm Internalization or Reinterpretation of Norms?
The weak presence of references to European norms in my study raises the question, if maybe a successful 
internalization of the norms have occurred, especially considering that Bayraktar’s study on the Armenian 
issue has showed a strong prevalence of the EU in her analysis until 2005. A closer look into a debate evolv-
ing around the nationalist response to the mass at the Akhtamar Church provides interesting clues. I will 
present two contrasting opinions by two columnists, both professors of Political Science and prominent 
intellectuals.
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Example 1: Baskin Oran, Professor of Political Science, author of the government commissioned minor-
ity report and a vocal, leftleaning-liberal public intellectual who writes regularly commentaries for the 
Radikal’s Sunday edition.
After participating in the mass at the Akhtamar Church in September 2010, Oran wrote five articles that 
touched upon all controversial issues such as the missing cross on top, the turkification of its name, the 
protests of the Armenian Diaspora etc. While these are more reports than opinion pieces, I will use his 
column from October 10, 2010, which he wrote in reaction to the political protests by the ultranationalist 
party MHP: In protest of the mass held at the Akdamar Church, the leadership of the MHP performed a 
Friday prayer on the sites of the ancient Armenian settlement Ani, on the ruins of an Armenian church. This 
protest action was strongly criticized by both liberal and conservative columnists as a populist, disrespect-
ful, and reactionary move. Oran also takes up this issue in his column and deconstructs this protest as 
the MHP’s failure to grasp the process of change and reform in Turkey, which is, accordingly, no longer an 
external, EU driven process, but found domestic ground. In response to the MHP party leader’s speech at 
the Ani settlement, where he glorified the conquests of the Ottoman Empire, Oran wrote in his column:
“When you have no future, you have to glorify the past. There is no future left for the anti-Westernism 
that the MHP represents because even though the inner dynamics of the EU have become reactionary 
(islamophobia, actions against immigrants etc), Turkey continued with the 2001-2004 EU reform pack-
age after mid 2008 with its ‘Kurdish initiative’ and has made progress. This means the following: The 
reform packages began with the initiative of the EU (external dynamic), but in the meantime, Turkey’s 
class structure has been taken up the wheel (internal dynamic). Despite the obstacles that the EU im-
poses, Turkey continues on its path toward a ‘contemporary civilization’. This is why it was a wrong 
choice for the MHP to put all its cards on the ‘Sevres Paranoia’ during the referendum. The tide is chang-
ing. The AKP is aware of this fact, the CHP is slowly waking up to it, but the MHP is still ignorant.” (Oran 
2010, my translation)
For Oran, the reform process is by now a domestically driven process where Turkey’s EU candidacy triggered 
a dynamic that cannot be reversed anymore. He regards this mainly as a societal dynamic and a process by 
civil society that seems to be independently occurring from political parties, which have to catch the tide. 
This is a highly optimistic reading of the transformation process to be one of civil society driven that is rep-
resentative for a group of left-leaning liberal intellectuals, who have supported the AKP’s initiatives on the 
constitutional referendum and Kurdish initiative in opposition to leftist and Kemalist groups that regarded 
these government initiatives merely as pretext to consolidate Islamic power in civil and political life instead 
of a democratization process. Since Oran is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s EU process, it is important to 
note that he seems to have given up on the idea that Turkey could become a member of the EU. Instead he 
reinvokes the Kemalist ideal of a road towards the “contemporary civilization,” but disconnects this road 
from a European orientation.
A very different account is provided by Türköne, who does not look forward to a “contemporary civilization” 
but rediscovers tolerance as an element of Turkish identity by looking to its past.
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Example 2: Mümtaz’er Türköne, Professor of Political Science, columnist of Zaman, former student leader 
of the right-wing nationalist movement.
In seven pieces related to the opening of the Akhtamar Church and Kurdish language rights, Türköne sup-
ports the liberalizing steps and evaluates them as critical steps of a transformation process of Turkey that 
frees itself from the burden of the past. While discussing a range of reforms that take place in Turkey, he 
does not refer to Turkey’s EU accession process even once. Instead, he assesses the reforms and the trans-
formation process at large solely from a domestic viewpoint as a necessary step in Turkey’s development 
to a more plural society and sharply criticizes nationalist opponents to these reforms. One column from 
September 2010, a few days after the mass in Akhtamar and the protests by the nationalist parties, he 
begins his article by asking:
“What is the source of this lack of tolerance and forbearance that comes up like a wall whenever we seek 
for solutions? Our culture is not a culture like that. From the first moment onwards, different cultures, 
languages, and religions have lived in these lands together. In this natural setting, tolerance and respect 
towards difference was a way of life. Living together has become a form of richness. It is impossible to 
forget this culture in only three generations. Honestly, where did we get this intolerance from, how did 
we learn this? What do we lose or gain when Armenians hold a mass in the Akdamar Church? What are 
we going to lose if the Sümela Monastery will revive through religious tourism? From which culture does 
this hostility and opposition to these religious mass services come from? Where did we get these hostile 
feelings? It is clear where we got this from: It comes from the foundation of this Republic, in which we 
not only put our hopes in, but also our fears. When there is a mass in Sümela, we think of the Pontus 
state. The Akdamar Church becomes a symbol for the aspiration of a Greater Armenia. (…) We have to 
confront these fears that have become a paranoia and understand how idiotic they are. Our biggest 
enemies are our fears. (…) We have to think about them, ask what they are good for, and whom they 
serve well.” (Türköne 2010a, my translation)
What is striking is how Türköne dislocates intolerance outside of Turkish culture and locates it into the 
Turkish Republic, which was built after a European, Western nation-state model. Thus, though only implic-
itly, he makes Europe responsible for intolerance in Turkey because of the Westphalian idea of a homog-
enous nation-state. This externalization of the problem is rather symptomatic for a convenient national 
narrative. Given that the Armenian Genocide and the deportation of the non-Muslim population preceded 
the Turkish Republic, this neat division of the good “tolerant Ottoman Empire” vs. the bad “intolerant 
Turkish Republic” is part of the nationalist rhetoric itself, which retains only a selective memory vis-à-vis 
the treatment of the non-Sunni population in the Ottoman Empire (Ungör 2011; Ayata 2011). Similarly, 
Türköne rhetorically asks in another article on the protest by the MHP to do a Friday prayer on the ruins 
of Ani “Would the Ottoman’s have gone and done a Friday prayer at Ani?” (Türköne 2010b). He urges the 
nationalist MHP to rethink their nationalism beyond the republican framework, and hence implicitly urges 
them not to be more “modern” but more “Ottoman”. This reframing and rediscovery of the Ottoman 
past as a tolerant, plural society corresponds rather well with the government’s emphasis on tolerance 
and its efforts to embrace cultural richness as a positive value. Certainly, such a reconstruction of toler-
ance is rather easy to adopt without an open confrontation why all these churches are empty today, and 
why there are only about 100,000 Non-Muslims left in Turkey. Hence, even though the embracement of 
tolerance and cultural richness figures very positively and prominently as a demarcation from being an 
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intolerant republic throughout most opinion pieces on the Akhtamar Church, the resistance to engage with 
the Armenian Genocide or with the murders of non-Muslims in the past years in Turkey does not really 
speak for an internalization of norms. Rather, it seems that a disassociation from an orthodox secularism 
in Turkey towards a new self-definition of a national identity where tolerance extents as so far only as to 
cultural artifacts, whose preservation also happens to have the beneficial effect of opening a new door for 
economic growth through faith tourism, is at stake.
4. Conclusion
While Turkey’s EU candidacy negotiations are still ongoing, and domestic reforms are still taking place that 
comply/fulfill (with) the acquis communautaire, this study showed that the normative reference point 
of Turkey’s transformation process is no longer linked to a (Kemalist) project of Europeanization and/or 
Westernization. Instead, this study argues that Turkey’s transformation process entails a reinvention of 
Turkish national identity through a nostalgic embracement of the history of the Ottoman Empire, which 
has been reinterpreted as a homegrown, successful example for multiculturalism, religious plurality, and 
tolerance. In this sense, this reinvention of Turkish national identity entails an overcoming of both ortho-
dox Kemalism and of a European ideal through a rediscovery of the Ottoman heritage. Yet, this reinter-
pretation occurs on the rather shaky grounds of a blindfolded view of the past, in particular the denial of 
the Armenian Genocide. I illustrated this process with the example of the renovation and opening of the 
Armenian Akhtamar Church, which became a showcase for Turkey’s self-promotion as a tolerant nation. 
A closer examination of this church opening through a media analysis revealed how this church opening 
becomes an instrument of the government to ward off international pressure to recognize the Armenian 
Genocide and to reassure the world that Turkey is tolerant towards its religious minorities despite the 
murder of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 and other murders of Christians in Turkey between 
2006 and 2008. The analysis of the public debate in columns and op-eds in four Turkish dailies showed that 
the government initiative to open the church was overall welcomed, yet also criticized for its shortcom-
ings such as the musealization of the church and the turkification of its name into Akdamar. While some 
journalists and columnists took this church opening as an opportunity to fundamentally question previous 
state policies suppressing cultural and religious diversity and to call upon to replace fear with tolerance, it 
is rather striking that this critical questioning only extends to the Republican period and falls short of con-
fronting the Armenian Genocide itself. Hence, while the public debate does not follow the government’s 
strategic approach towards the church opening, the uncritical resorting and embracement of the discourse 
on Ottoman tolerance in this context shows that the public debate does not depart from this transfigura-
tion of the past.
The absence of European references in this debate is striking, but not surprising given the deteriorating 
EU-Turkey relationship. That the reference point for debates on tolerance has become mainly the Ottoman 
past could – at first sight – be read as a successful norm adoption and norm internalization. Yet, as the 
analysis of the debates on the Akhtamar church unfolds, this resorting to the past when recasting Turkey 
as a tolerant nation today continues to rest on the fundamental denial of what exactly happened to the 
multicultural plurality of the Ottoman Empire and on the denial that minorities are still endangered in pres-
ent day Turkey. To conclude, without an acknowledgement of the Armenian Genocide, Turkey’s nostalgic 
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embracement of the Ottoman past and representation of norms such as tolerance as the ‘true’ Turkish/
Islamic norms does not stand for a norm internalization or norm adaption process, but instead, for a dis-
connection between the norm and the practice.
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